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The ideomotor theory of voluntary behavior assumes that the selection and control of
a concrete goal-directed movement depends on imagining its direct perceptual conse-
quences. However, this perception-guided assumption neglects the fact that behavioral
control entails a hierarchical mechanism wherein conceptual expectations – action goals –
can modulate lower level perceptuo-motor representations. In this paper, we focus on the
hierarchical nature of voluntary behavior by distinguishing between perceptual represen-
tations of images that relate to attainment of concrete movement goals and conceptual
representations of ideas that pertain to attainment of action goals. We review the domi-
nant ideomotor principle of the direct perceptuo-motor relation and examine its limitation
in the light of the proposed hierarchical view of voluntary behavior. Finally, we offer a
revision of the ideomotor principle that allows extension of its explanatory domain from
perception-guided movement to conceptual, idea-guided action.
Keywords: voluntary behavior, goal-hierarchy, ideomotor principle, idea-guided action
In his seminal work “The principles of psychology,”William James
popularized the notion that all voluntary behavior entails a fun-
damental principle of ideomotor action (James, 1890). The ideo-
motor principle states that selection and control of a particular
movement depends on the anticipation of a sensory effect, which
is normally experienced as its immediate product. This notion has
been inherited by modern-day empirical psychology and has been
translated into the experimental prediction that movement execu-
tion should be influenced by a perceptual image of the movement’s
effect. Proponents of the ideomotor principle have repeatedly
employed stimulus-response paradigms to demonstrate that sim-
ple movements are directly linked to the perception of their effects.
This work resulted in a plethora of reports in support of the
prediction of “perception-guided” movement selection (Green-
wald, 1970a; Chartrand and Bargh, 1999; Brass et al., 2000, 2001;
Kunde, 2001; Kilner et al., 2003; Pfister et al., 2010), making the
perception-guided ideomotor principle fundamental to various
accounts of voluntary behavior (Greenwald, 1970b; Prinz, 1987;
Hommel et al., 2001; Haggard, 2005; Kunde et al., 2007; Custers
and Aarts, 2010).
In everyday goal-directed behavior, however, actors do not
typically voluntarily decide which concrete movements to exe-
cute. Instead, decisions to move are contingent on the expecta-
tions regarding actor’s higher-order, conceptual goal (Jacob and
Jeannerod, 2005; Adolphs, 2009; Hauser and Wood, 2010). For
example, guidance of everyday voluntary behavior, like getting in
touch with a friend, entails both the expectation of the concep-
tual goal – choosing to make a phone call (or to send an email
by using the laptop), as well as selection of concrete movement
goals, for example grasping the phone (Searle, 1983; Mele, 1992;
Grafton and de Hamilton, 2007; Kilner et al., 2007; Pacherie, 2008).
Present versions of the ideomotor principle are not well suited to
provide an understanding of these more complex real life behav-
iors. Understanding the mechanisms that underpin guidance of
more complex behaviors requires explanation of the role of prior
conceptual knowledge (Johnson-Frey, 2003; Jacob and Jeannerod,
2005), over and above the anticipation of movement’s sensory
consequences.
Whereas ample evidence supports “perception-guided” move-
ment, at present few experiments have investigated the role of
conceptual goals in selection and control of behavior. There are
several reasons why this could be the case. First, the practical diffi-
culties of empirically examining how individuals’ conceptual goals
influence their behavior are clear. Conceptual goals relate to actor’s
internal states that cannot be directly perceived by the observer’s
senses, but need to be inferred by recruiting their own conceptual
knowledge to make sense of the observed behavior. Second, theo-
ries that are tailored to explain voluntary behavior often implicitly
adopt versions of behaviorist (perceptuo-motor) principles, which
inherently do not include the involvement of conceptual represen-
tations in explanations of guidance of voluntary behavior (Lashley,
1951; Jacob and Jeannerod, 2005). In this article we will review
some new studies that investigated the role of higher-level concep-
tual action goals in selection and control of one’s own behavior
and in processing of other individuals’ observed behavior. We con-
clude with a proposal for a revision of the ideomotor principle that
allows extension of its explanatory domain from the perceptuo-
motor level of perception-guided movement to the conceptual
level of “idea-guided action.”
PERCEPTION-GUIDED VOLUNTARY BEHAVIOR
Paradoxically, the term ideomotor action was first coined by
the British physiologist William B. Carpenter (1852) to explain
peculiar involuntary movements that are executed by individuals
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independent of their conscious action intention (for a historical
review, see Stock and Stock, 2004). Later, the ideomotor action
gained ground as the fundamental principle for the account of
voluntary behavior (James, 1890). Carpenter, like James, was ded-
icated to demystifying the underlying neurocognitive mechanisms
of movements, which can be observed in a variety of “psychic”
phenomena (e.g., Ouija boards, moving tables, the divining rod,
the magic pendulum). To provide a rational explanation for these
peculiar phenomena, Carpenter and James proposed a principle
of ideomotor action that assumes a direct link between perception
and movement. Furthermore, in addition to an anticipation of
the sensation of movement effects, ideomotor action is proposed
to require a presence of a conceptual expectation (an idea) that a
certain action will occur (Carpenter, 1852). In other words, hand
movement over the Ouija board should be contingent to the idea
(expectation) that some “psychic” force will generate movement.
However, present day research on the ideomotor phenomena
has mainly neglected the role of more abstract expectations in
guidance of goal-directed movements.
More recently, selection and control of involuntary move-
ments caused by the direct perception of similar movements of
other individuals (i.e., mimicking) has received substantial inter-
est from researchers in psychology (e.g., Prinz, 1997; Dijksterhuis
and Bargh, 2001; Hommel et al., 2001). For example, Wofgang
Prinz and colleagues (Prinz, 1987, 1997; Hommel et al., 2001) pro-
posed that perception, planning, and control of movements share
a common representational domain. To find support for com-
mon representations of perception and movement, participants
executed finger-movements in response to an arbitrary number
while observing task-irrelevant images of movements, similar or
dissimilar in terms of the movement direction (e.g., Brass et al.,
2000; Brass et al., 2001). The findings showed that movements
that were similar to the perceived image were executed faster,
compared to the dissimilar ones; providing evidence for a direct
“perception-guided” movement.
In a similar vein, an account of social behavior put forward
by social psychologists Dijksterhuis and Bargh (2001) introduced
the elegant notion of the “perception – movement expressway”
to explain that people tend to copy the observed behaviors of
other individuals. The core notion put forth by the authors
is that people have a natural tendency to imitate their con-
specifics, which in some social settings need to be inhibited in
order to carry out volitional action. For example, Chartrand and
Bargh (1999) have demonstrated that individuals copy move-
ments of the coactors with whom they interact, without the
presence of a conscious action intention to do so. These authors
instructed participants to rate photographs together with a con-
federate coactor who either repeatedly shook their foot or rubbed
their face. The results showed that participants shook their foot
more often while working with the confederate who shook their
foot and rubbed their face more often when they perceived
face rubbing. This notion that movement execution is auto-
matically governed by perception of similar movement is in
agreement with the ideomotor proposal of “perception-guided”
movement.
The neurocognitive mechanism that was proposed to account
for the reported social and cognitive psychology findings relies
on a direct coupling/common representation of observed and
executed movement (Prinz, 1997; Hommel et al., 2001; Hom-
mel, 2009). More recently, a useful distinction has been made
between the “weak” ideomotor principle that entails an interme-
diate step between sensory prediction and movement execution
and “strong” ideomotor principle, which assume no cognitive
intermediation (Shin et al., 2010). For example, some authors
consider current ideomotor theory to be “weak” due to the appar-
ent perception-action duality that is maintained (Richardson and
Michaels, 2001). Notably, although ideomotor accounts of volun-
tary behavior emphasize the role of abstract ideas (i.e., concepts)
that represent action expectation, the empirical work is mainly
focused on the associative mechanisms that underpin perception-
guided movement. The bias toward the perception-movement
coupling in behavioral control has led to the formation of asso-
ciative perception-guided theories of voluntary behavior. These
theories have mainly neglected the role of abstract ideas (i.e.,
expectations) that are present prior to any association of percep-
tion and movement (Lashley, 1951) and have been criticized for a
number of reasons. For example, the theories are deemed limited
in their focus on arbitrary perceptuo-motor mappings (i.e., sim-
ple button presses to arbitrary stimuli – associating left perceptual
feature with a left motor response). Therefore, ideomotor theories
are still limited in their capability of explaining everyday object-
related action, which necessitates conceptual knowledge regard-
ing functional properties of the used objects (e.g., Johnson-Frey,
2003).
IDEA-GUIDED VOLUNTARY BEHAVIOR
Following reasoning derived mainly from introspection (Lotze,
1852; James, 1890), research on voluntary behavior in cogni-
tive and social psychology focused on the mechanism of direct
coupling between perception and movement (Greenwald, 1970b;
Prinz, 1997; Dijksterhuis and Bargh, 2001; Hommel et al., 2001),
stripped away from the higher, conceptual levels of action control
(Lashley, 1951). In contrast, recent theoretical and computational
work proposes that the control and planning of simple bodily goal-
directed movements depends on prior conceptual expectations
that are related to achievement of a particular outcome (Searle,
1983; Wolpert et al., 2003; Grafton and de Hamilton, 2007; Kilner
et al., 2007; Pacherie, 2008). For example, it has recently been pro-
posed that a multitiered model underpins selection and control
of one’s own behavior (Grafton and de Hamilton, 2007), as well
as predicting and understanding the behavior of other individuals
(Kilner et al., 2007). Grafton and de Hamilton (2007) proposed
a hierarchy of control which includes: (1) the conceptual level of
action intention, (2) the concrete movement goal level needed to
realize the intention, (3) motor commands that activate the mus-
cles to attain the movement goal, and (4) body kinematics that
entail a synergy of different muscles to produce movements in
time and space. Also, a recently proposed active inference account
suggests that a hierarchy of predictions underpins both observa-
tion and execution of movement, without distinguishing between
sensory and motor representations (Clark, in press; Friston et al.,
2012).
This seemingly opposing nature of the perceptuo-motor (asso-
ciative) and conceptual (hierarchical) approaches of action control
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has created tension and opacity throughout the fields of psychol-
ogy and cognitive sciences. In order to relieve the tension created
between the perceptuo-motor and conceptual views of voluntary
behavior, the field needs to focus on the interplay between prior
conceptual knowledge about the world and the perceptuo-motor
associations that are formed by our experiences (Ochipa et al.,
1992; Hodges et al., 2000; Wolpert et al., 2003; Pacherie, 2008;
Adolphs, 2009). For example, a strong line of evidence from neu-
ropsychology suggests that selection and control of goal-directed
behavior entails involvement of a conceptual system that includes
world knowledge about objects and their abstract properties and
a perceptuo-motor production system that includes information
regarding object manipulation (Roy and Square, 1985; Ochipa
et al., 1992). Crucially, Ochipa et al. (1992) showed that a damaged
conceptual system causes impairments related to abstract knowl-
edge about objects, referred to as conceptual or ideational apraxia,
whereas damage to the perceptuo-motor system leads to ideomo-
tor apraxia – impairments of concrete movement production (Roy
and Square, 1985).
Carpenter (1852) has already pointed out that perception-
guided movement is contingent on the conceptual expectation
that a particular movement will occur. It is important to note that
Carpenter’s suggestion that multiple levels might be involved in
selection and control of behavior resonates with the hierarchi-
cal accounts of action control (Lashley, 1951; Searle, 1983; Roy
and Square, 1985; Grafton and de Hamilton, 2007; Kilner et al.,
2007; Pacherie, 2008). Nevertheless, most psychological experi-
ments throughout the last decades, even those investigating the
ideomotor action (e.g., Brass et al., 2000), have neglected this
notion of apparent hierarchy. Various paradigms had a limited
focus on the relation between the execution of simple movements
and the perceptual images that they produce. Important to note
is that even though many experiments try to avoid addressing the
conceptual level of action control, it is inevitably present in the
participants’ explicit or implicit expectations during selection and
guidance of their voluntary behavior (Clark, in press).
THE HIERARCHY FROM PERCEPTION-GUIDED MOVEMENT
TO IDEA-GUIDED ACTION
A number of recent experimental paradigms were employed to
investigate the role of conceptual expectations that pertain to
abstract ideas in governing selection and control of goal-directed
movements (Massen and Prinz, 2007a,b; Liepelt et al., 2008;
Ondobaka et al., 2011). For example, in a study by Ondobaka
et al. (2011) participants were facing a coactor while sitting at
the table with an integrated touchscreen on which, on each trial,
four playing cards appeared – one in each corner. First, the coac-
tor selected the higher or lower card of the two cards that were
revealed in front of him. This action then led to the immediate
revelation of the participant’s cards. Participants were instructed
to either match or mismatch the coactor’s conceptual goal (i.e., to
select the higher or lower card). During the experiment, regard-
less of the task (matching or mismatching the conceptual goal),
participants received trials in which their response led to matched
or mismatched movements with the coactor. For example, in the
“match conceptual goal” case, on some trials, the conceptual goal
(e.g., the higher card) required the same movement to be carried
out by both participants and coactor (e.g., reach to the left). In
other trials, the same conceptual goal match may lead to a mis-
match of movement goals (e.g., the coactor reaches right for the
higher card and the participant must then reach left for the higher
card). Findings indicated that participants’ movement execution
was solely influenced by the perception of the coactor’s movement
(i.e., left or right) when their conceptual goals also matched the
coactor’s, suggesting that a hierarchy of intentions governs goal-
directed behavior. That is, conceptual goals apparently sit atop
the perception-guided level in the hierarchical control of overt
behavior.
Interestingly, a similar hierarchy between perception-guided
and idea-guided action control has been investigated in tool-use
(Massen and Prinz, 2007a,b, 2009). In a series of experiments,
the authors employed a joint tool-use paradigm wherein two
participants, in consecutive order, touched one of two targets.
Participants could touch the target by moving a lever that could
translate around one of two activated pivotal points, resulting in
the opposite movement-to-target action rule. The setup allowed
the authors to manipulate congruency between coactors’ kinemat-
ics (moving toward or away from the body), concrete movement
goals (target location) and abstract action goals (action rules indi-
cating target-to-movement mapping) in order to test which goal
level most strongly influenced observers’ performance. The results
suggest that observer’s performance accuracy was significantly
higher when abstract action goals (rules) matched, compared to
condition in which coactors’ action goals mismatched. Moreover,
Massen and Prinz (2009) reported that only when the two coactors
adopted the same action goal (idea-guided action), was an effect
of match in kinematics and movement goals (perception-guided
movement) observed. In contrast, when their action goals mis-
matched, no perception-guided movement effect was observed.
These results are in line with findings from the social card-selection
study (Ondobaka et al., 2011) and indicate a guiding role of expec-
tation regarding conceptual goals in the processing of concrete
movement goals.
HIERARCHICAL IDEOMOTOR ACCOUNT OF VOLUNTARY
BEHAVIOR
Results from these studies are in congruence with Carpenter’s orig-
inal proposal of the ideomotor action principle,which goes beyond
perception-guided movement and stresses the importance of con-
ceptual action expectation in the guidance of voluntary behavior.
Recent findings show that in the social contexts wherein abstract
ideas govern voluntary behavior, perception-guided effects are
present only if coactors’ ideas match (Massen and Prinz, 2009;
Ondobaka et al., 2011). Likewise, findings are in agreement with
the assumption that the selection and control of one’s own vol-
untary goal-directed behavior entails a hierarchical mechanism
wherein expectation of conceptual goals can modulate concrete
bodily movements in space and time (Figure 1). For example,
engaging in a goal-directed behavior like getting in touch with
a friend entails idea-guided conceptual goal to make a phone
call. Subsequently, selection and control of concrete image-guided
movements involved in grasping the phone transporting it to the
ear must depend on the expectation that the phone will be used
in the first place (and not the laptop) and results in the inference
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FIGURE 1 | Illustration of a hierarchical ideomotor principle of action in
execution and observation.The actor generates action expectations (i.e.,
ideas) at the abstract conceptual level (action goal to make a phone call) as
well as at the movement level (movement goal to transport the phone to the
ear) and infers these by evaluating the sensory inputs. The observer needs to
infer both aspects as well. First, is the actor going to make a phone call? This
conceptual goal inference depends on recruiting the conceptual knowledge
regarding the function of the object. Second, is the actor bringing the phone
to the ear? This movement goal inference depends on the concrete
perceptuo-motor associations that link phone to the ear.
of one’s own behavior as getting in touch with a friend. Simi-
larly, understanding whether the observed actor is getting in touch
with a friend requires a parallel inference of both conceptual and
movement goals (Kilner et al., 2007) by relying on the same hierar-
chical mechanism that is used for action execution in the observer
(Figure 1).
The current proposal asks for an extension of the domi-
nant approaches of voluntary behavior (Greenwald, 1970b; Hom-
mel et al., 2001; Heyes, 2011), which mainly focus on the
direct perception-movement links that underpin the genera-
tion of perception-guided movement. Consequently, we suggest
that dominant views on the nature of perception-action cou-
pling (Greenwald, 1970b; Hommel et al., 2001; Heyes, 2011)
should be extended to allow the influence of idea-guided action
on top of perception-guided movement (Lashley, 1951; Oztop
et al., 2005; Grafton and de Hamilton, 2007). Following the
active inference account (Clark, in press), the current pro-
posal can be viewed as a strong version of the ideomotor
account – a version that does not necessitate any intermediate
cognitive steps in order to translate perceived input into move-
ment. Our hierarchical ideomotor framework states that bodily
movement fulfills conceptually guided proprioceptive and visual
expectations, without the necessity of an intermediate cogni-
tive process. However, the proposed action hierarchy implies
that an antecedent state of expectation does play a fundamen-
tal role in shaping perception and action. Crucially, the addi-
tion of the conceptual-perceptual (i.e., idea-image) hierarchy
and the extension of the anticipatory ideomotor mechanism to
the conceptual level leads to significant theoretical advances.
First, the incorporation of the conceptual level (Johnson-Frey,
2003) allows the current account to explain everyday object-
related action. Second, the proposal maintains the indistinguish-
able nature of sensory and motor representations, but allows
prior expectations to play a modulatory role in the anticipation
of sensory consequences that are directly related to movement
execution.
Collectively, we summarized recent studies that demonstrate
the fundamental role of idea-guided behavior (Massen and Prinz,
2007a,b; Ondobaka et al., 2011) and proposed an extension of
the ideomotor principle’s explanatory domain from perception-
guided movement to conceptual, idea-guided action. The proac-
tive and hierarchical nature of the extensions accommodate the
pivotal role of prior conceptual expectation (i.e., ideas) in provid-
ing a scaffold for direct perceptuo-motor coupling, thus maintain-
ing the “strong” ideomotor character. At the same time, the pro-
posal is in accordance with the origins of the ideomotor principle
(Carpenter, 1852), in which a fundamental role for prior expec-
tations in voluntary movement is already suggested. Adopting the
hierarchical ideomotor view wherein action concepts and move-
ment goals interact during selection and control of action could
potentially unify the perceptuo-motor and conceptual frameworks
of voluntary behavior.
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